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Indirect Discrimination, Justification and 
Proportionality: Are UK Claimants at a 
Disadvantage?
JACKIE A. LANE* AND RACHEL INGLEBY** 
ABSTRACT
The minimum standard of scrutiny for the justification defence in the context of indi-
rect discrimination was first set out by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz (1986). This established that 
an indirectly discriminatory measure is justified if it meets a real need and is appro-
priate and necessary for meeting that need. The UK courts’ approach to the concept 
of proportionality within the context of this justification defence may nevertheless 
have distinct disadvantages for claimants in comparison with their EU counterparts. 
The approach of the UK courts is assessed here by considering the development of 
case law in this area, both in the Employment Appeal Tribunal and in the higher 
courts. When compared to the approach taken by the CJEU, it becomes apparent 
that there is a significant difference between the ways in which UK courts and the 
CJEU interpret the justification defence. Findings show that the approach of the 
UK courts significantly disadvantages claimants, leading to the conclusion that the 
UK may not be fully compliant with EU law. To remedy this defect, it is suggested 
that there are at least two practical alternative solutions. The first is that Parliament 
could incorporate a strict necessity test into the Equality Act. Alternatively, the 
courts could develop a ‘robust approach’ to proportionality. The outcomes of a large 
number of employment law cases are examined here, appearing to suggest that the 
latter approach may have greater benefits for claimants than those associated with 
adopting a strict necessity test, although it is unlikely that will find favour with either 
Parliament or the courts.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Equality Act 2010 (EqA) makes discrimination in the workplace 
towards protected groups unlawful. Indirect discrimination is not unlawful, 
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however, if it is justified as being ‘a proportionate means of achieving a legit-
imate aim’.1 In assessing the merits of justification, courts and tribunals must 
apply the principle of proportionality, with the aim of striking a balance 
between the interests of the employee and the employer.
The interpretation of justification is crucial to determining the extent of 
protection for UK claimants from indirect discrimination. This article com-
pares the interpretation given to justification by the domestic courts against 
those of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It evaluates 
the concern that the approach of UK courts and tribunals is less rigorous 
than that of the CJEU, to the detriment to UK claimants.
These claims are assessed by reference to empirical evidence from a num-
ber of Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) decisions, to discover whether 
by applying different approaches to the assessment of justification in these 
cases, the outcome of the case would thereby be altered. It is also suggested 
that a way of increasing protection for claimants, based on existing UK case 
law, may be to render the proportionality assessment more robust by requir-
ing that further enquiries are routinely made in order to ensure that there is 
sufficient evidence as to the discriminatory impact of a measure.
2. JUSTIFICATION: UK and EU LAW
There are significant differences in the approach to justification taken by 
the UK courts in comparison with the CJEU. Despite initially setting a high 
threshold for justification in Steel v Union of Post Office Worker (1978),2 
where justification was equated with business necessity, in Ojutiku v 
Manpower Services Commission (1982) Eveleigh LJ defined justification as 
‘acceptable to right-thinking people as sound and tolerable reasons’,3 thereby 
equating justification with the far less rigorous standard of reasonableness.
Nevertheless, in Bilka-Kaufhaus v Weber von Hartz (1986), the CJEU 
determined that indirectly discriminatory measures could be justified 
only if they ‘correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking, are 
appropriate with a view to achieving the objective in question and are 
necessary to that end’.4 This equated justification with necessity—a much 
1 Equality Act 2010, s 19(2)(d).
2 Steel v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] ICR 181, [187] (Philips J).
3 Ojutiku v Manpower Services Commission [1982] IRLR 418, [20] (Everleigh LJ).
4 Case C-170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Weber von Hartz [1986] IRLR 317 at [37]—The 
Bilka test.
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higher standard than that applied in Ojutiku, and more closely allied to 
the test in Steel.
In an attempt to clarify the issue, the Court of Appeal (CA) again con-
sidered what the correct approach to justification should be in Hampson v 
Department of Education and Science (1986).5 The CA, however, avoided 
imposing a strict necessity requirement, as set out in Bilka, by advocating 
a proportionality assessment which balanced the discriminatory effect of a 
provision with the reasonable needs of a business. This approach was subse-
quently approved by the House of Lords in Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) 
Ltd (1993),6 thus settling the direction taken in UK case law in this area ever 
since.
These developments in case law, where the question has been whether 
or not indirect discrimination was justified, have allowed UK courts and 
tribunals considerable scope when considering the correct definition of jus-
tification. It has enabled them to avoid applying a strict test of necessity and 
to retain the familiar common law concept of reasonableness in the form of 
reasonable necessity. This absence of a strict necessity test has led equality 
campaigners and politicians to express concern that UK claimants may be 
afforded less protection from indirect discrimination than that intended in 
EU law.7
These concerns have also been expressed by several academics. Hervey, 
writing shortly after the decision in Hampson, suggested that UK courts 
were not following the principles laid down by CJEU in relation to justifica-
tion.8 Connolly expressed similar concerns, demonstrating by reference to 
high profile cases such as Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority9 how the 
absence of a strict necessity test in domestic law gave employers ‘more lee-
way’ to discriminate against employees.10
5 Hampson v Department of Education and Science [1989] IRLR 69. See comments of I. Smith 
and A. Baker, Smith & Wood’s Employment Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010) at 321.
6 Webb v EMO Cargo (UK) Ltd [1993] IRLR 27 HL.
7 See, for instance, the comments of the Liberal Democrats at the PBC (EB) 8th Sitting Col 
284. The Equality Bill Parliamentary 2009; see also, concerns expressed by Equal Opportunities 
Commission in 1999 at the Select Committee on Education and Employment 2 April 1998 at 
https://www.publications.parliament (date last accessed 10 July 2016).
8 T. Hervey, ‘Justification for Indirect Discrimination in Employment: European Community 
and United Kingdom Compared’ (1991) 40 ICLQ 807.
9 Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority (1991), Case C-127/92 (1994), ICR 112; [1994] 1 All 
ER 495, CA.
10 M. Connolly, ‘Discrimination Law: Justification, Alternative Measures and Defences Based 
on Sex’ (2001) 30 ILJ 313.
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More recently, shortly before the enactment of the EqA, Baker expressed 
concern as to the relative weakness of the UK standard of justification as 
compared to that of the CJEU.11 Baker also expressed the view that over 
20  years of UK jurisprudence on the matter made it unlikely that the 
courts would ‘back pedal’ and adopt a test of necessity in relation to jus-
tification, but he did suggest that it was possible to develop a more robust 
model of proportionality, based on existing case law, which could potentially 
strengthen the protection from indirect discrimination,12 a possibility which 
is given further consideration below.
This article builds on the work of these earlier commentators by exam-
ining, with reference to empirical evidence, whether the difference in 
approach by the UK courts results in UK claimants being treated less fairly 
because of the failure to impose a strict necessity test in relation to indirect 
discrimination.
3. PROPORTIONALITY: CASE LAW
Although the evidence suggests that UK claimants may be at a disadvan-
tage, a proportionality assessment has the potential to provide more effec-
tive protection for claimants. A  robust proportionality assessment could 
even deliver greater protection than that provided by a strict test of neces-
sity, since a significant discriminatory impact could outweigh even necessity. 
In cases where the discriminatory impact of a measure is fully considered, 
the intensity of scrutiny afforded by a proportionality assessment is con-
siderable.13 For example, in R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence,14 the 
court gave substantial weight to the discriminatory impact of a scheme that 
was designed to restrict compensation payments to prisoners of war. The 
heavy emphasis given to the discriminatory impact led the CA to find the 
scheme to be unlawful, despite the large margin of appreciation granted to 
the Secretary of State in this case.
Similarly, in R (E) v Governing Body of JFS,15 the Supreme Court consid-
ered in the fullest sense the discriminatory impact of measures designed to 
restrict access to a Jewish school. Although JFS was decided on the grounds 
11 A. Baker, ‘Proportionality and Employment Discrimination in the UK’ (2008) 37 ILJ 305.
12 Ibid.
13 See S. Deakin and G. S. Morris Labour Law, 6th edn (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 642.
14 R (on the application of Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] 1 WLR 3213, CA.
15 R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15.
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of direct discrimination, most of the Supreme Court judges also considered 
the issue of indirect discrimination and justification. What stands out from 
a reading of the judgments is that the outcome with regard to justification 
differed according to the individual judge’s application of proportionality.
The facts of the case were that a child was refused admission to an 
Orthodox Jewish school on the grounds that his Jewish heritage had 
not descended through the maternal line. Lord Mance adopted a broad 
approach to the question of justification. This included consideration as to 
whether the school had established that other less discriminatory alterna-
tives were unsuitable to achieving a legitimate aim, but he went even further 
than this by considering the impact on society of maintaining the discrimi-
natory policy. This led Lord Mance to the conclusion, with which Lady Hale, 
Lord Kerr, Lord Hope and Lord Clark concurred, that the policy was not 
justified.16 In contrast to this broad approach, Lord Roger and Lord Brown 
took a much narrower view of what proportionality means, giving greater 
consideration to the needs of the discriminator, with much less emphasis on 
discriminatory impact. On this analysis, the policy was justified.17
JFS and Elias illustrate how the intensity of review in proportionality 
assessments is substantially increased if adequate consideration is given 
to discriminatory impact. Unfortunately, this particular evidence suggests 
that the approach outlined in these cases is rarely applied at the level of 
the EAT. This applies to some of the more recent cases that are considered 
below.18 Furthermore, there are other precedents in which the importance 
of considering the discriminatory impact in its fullest sense is given consid-
erably less emphasis. For example, in Barry v Midland Bank,19 a case which 
is still frequently cited and followed in EAT decisions, the discriminatory 
impact of a voluntary severance scheme which was alleged to have discrimi-
nated against Mrs Barry as a part-time worker was not fully examined, the 
justification issue not even given consideration. If tribunals continue to have 
a choice of approaches in relation to proportionality—and the evidence in 
this study suggests that the approach in Barry is more commonly applied 
than the approach in Elias and JFS—this can only serve to exacerbate the 
16 Lord Mance at [97]–[100]; Lady Hale at [71]; Lord Kerr at [123]; Lord Clark at [154]; Lord 
Hope at [214]–[215].
17 Ibid. Lord Rodger at [233]; Lord Brown at [255].
18 See Cherfi v G4S Security Service Ltd [2011] UKEAT 0379 10 2405 (24 May 2011), 
Kapenova v Department of Health [2013] UKEAT 0142 13 1404 (14 April 2014), Eddie & 15 
Ors v HCL Insurance BPO Services Ltd [2015] UKEAT 0152 14 0502 (5 February 2015).
19 Barry v Midland Bank plc [1999] UKHL 38.
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problem of claimants being treated unfairly compared with those whose 
claims reach the CJEU.
Overall, courts and tribunals seem to be far more concerned with inves-
tigating the needs of employers than considering the discriminatory impact 
of a measure in its fullest sense. An illustration of this imbalance is Pill LJ’s 
comments in Hardy & Hanson plc v Lax20 where he stated that a ‘broader 
understanding of the needs of business will be required’ in cases concerning 
justification.21 Pill LJ did not add that tribunals also had a proactive duty to 
fully consider discriminatory impact within the proportionality assessment. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the EAT appears to give this aspect of 
the proportionality assessment scant consideration. Furthermore, in cases 
where the EAT fails to fully consider discriminatory impact, this disad-
vantage will not be offset by a strict approach to necessity as it is still the 
view of the Supreme Court that the correct test is reasonable, rather than 
strict, necessity. Lady Hale confirmed in Homer v Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire Police [2010]22 that reasonable necessity is the correct standard to 
be applied in relation to justification.
4. JUSTIFICATION AND THE EAT
A. Comparing Different Approaches to Justification at the EAT
Given the lack of a strict necessity test, as per Bilka, it is at least question-
able whether the UK is fully compliant with EU law in relation to justi-
fication. Recent case law coming from the CJEU has confirmed that the 
Bilka test also applies to the new categories of protected groups outlined in 
the Equality Directive.23 UK law should, therefore, be providing equivalent 
protection to that provided by the Bilka criteria to all protected groups. We 
sought to examine whether this is, in fact, the case by considering a number 
of EAT decisions made between 1992 and 2015. We also sought to establish 
whether any deficiency in the UK approach could be remedied by applying 
a more robust approach to proportionality.
20 Hardy & Hanson plc v Lax [2005] EWCA Civ 846.
21 Ibid.
22 Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2012] UKSC 15.
23 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation (27 November 2000); Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm [2005] 
ECR 1-9981; Case C-555/07 Kucukdeveciv v Swedx Gmbh & Co KG [2010] All ER (EC) 807.
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We considered 44 EAT cases which were heard during this period and 
which involved issues of indirect discrimination, proportionality and jus-
tification,24 analysing the decisions made in those cases in relation to the 
following:
  (i) The general approach of the EAT in relation to proportionality;
(ii) Whether applying the Bilka test of justification made a difference to the result 
in individual cases;
(iii) Whether applying a robust approach to proportionality, whereby discrimina-
tory impacts were weighed in the fullest sense, made a difference to the result 
in individual cases.
B. The Successful Cases
Of the 44 cases, 21 cases25 resulted in a positive outcome for the claimant 
in that justification for the alleged discrimination was not established by 
the employer, while 23 claimants were unsuccessful.26 Of the successful 
24 Available at https://www.bailii.org/uk/case/UKEAT/ (date last accessed 27 October 2016).
25 Hellewell v Manchester Metropolitan University [1996] UKEAT 835/95/0307, Fuber v Wirrel 
Borough Council [1997] UKEAT 1141/96/0207, Davis v Neath Port Talbot County Borough 
Council [1999] UKEAT 449/97/1509 [1999] IRLR 796 UKEAT, Chief Constable of Avon & 
Somerset Constabulary v Chew [2001] UKEAT 503/00/2809 [2001] All ER (D) 101 (Sep), Barton 
v Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd [2003] UKEAT 18/03/0304, Redfearn v Serco 
Ltd [2005] UKEAT 0153/05/2707 [2005] IRLR 744 EAT, British Airways Plc v Grundy [2005] 
UKEAT 0676/04/1908, Sharp v Caledonia Group Services Ltd [2005] UKEAT/0041/05/0111 
[2006] IRLR 4, Mitchell v David Evans Agricultural Ltd [2006] UKEAT 0083/06/1503, Redcar 
& Cleveland Council v Bainbridge & Ors [2006] UKEAT 0135/06/1610, South Tyneside 
Metropolitan Borough Council v Anderson & Ors [2007] UKEAT 0684/05/2603, Cumbria 
County Council v Dow & Ors (No 1) [2007] UKEAT 0148/06/2405 [2008] IRLR 91, Aviance 
UK Ltd v Garcia – Bello [2007] UKEAT 0044/07/2012, MacCulloch v Imperial Chemical 
Industries Plc [2008] UKEAT 0119/08/2207, Loxley v BAE Systems Land Systems (Munitions 
& Ordinance Ltd) [2008] UKEAT 0156/08/2907 [2008] ICR 1347, West Yorkshire Police & 
Ors Homer [2008] UKEAT 0191/08/2710, Pulham & Ors v London Borough of Barkingham 
[2009] UKEAT 0516/08/2810, Newcastle Upon Tyne NHS Hospital Trust v Armstrong & Ors 
[2010] UKEAT 0069/09/2202, Bury Metropolitan Borough Council v Hamilton & Ors [2011] 
UKEAT 0413-5/09/2801, Farrar v North Yorkshire Police [2012] UKEAT 0528/11/0810, Games 
v University of Kent [2014] UKEAT 0524/13/1407.
26 St Matthias Church of England School v Crizzle [1992] UKEAT 409/90/0712 [1993] IRLR 
472, Burch v Tesco Stores Ltd [2000] UKEAT 793 99 1906, Cross & Ors v British Airways 
Plc [2005] UKEAT 0572/04/2303, Faulkner v Hampshire Constabulary [2007] UKEAT 
0505/05/0203, Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council [2007] UKEAT 0009/07/3003 
[2007] IRLR 434, Middlesborough Council v Surtees & Ors [2007] UKEAT 0077/07/1707, 
McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs [2007], West Midlands Police v Blackburn 
& Anor [2007] UKEAT, Eweida v British Airways Plc [2008] UKEAT 0123/08/2011, Seldon 
v Clarkson Wright & Jakes [2008] UKEAT 0063/08/1912, Islington v Ladele [2008] UKEAT 
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cases, eleven resulted in the overturning of the decision of the Employment 
Tribunal (ET) on the issue of justification, while ten confirmed the decision 
of the ET. Although five of these cases were appealed further, none were 
overturned on the issue of justification.27
Further analysis of the successful decisions reveals a high level of consist-
ency in the application of the Hampson test of proportionality, in which dis-
criminatory impact is weighed against the reasonable needs of the employer. 
This approach was applied in most of the cases analysed, although some 
equal pay cases did confine themselves to applying the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU.28
It is disturbing to note that some of the cases in which the ET decision 
was overturned suggest an insufficient understanding of the relevant legal 
test for justification at tribunal level. In Games v University of Kent (2014), 
for example, a worker who was near to retirement was required to obtain 
a PhD in order to continue working as a lecturer.29 This measure indi-
rectly discriminated against the claimant on the grounds of age. The ET 
determined that the discrimination was justified as, prior to the provision 
being applied, the claimant had been given ample opportunity to obtain 
the qualification. The acceptance by the ET of such spurious justification 
indicates a substantial misunderstanding of the relevant legal test.
Other cases demonstrate the perceived ‘wriggle room’ that a test of 
reasonable necessity gives to employers. In South Tyneside Metropolitan 
Council v Anderson, the employer argued that:
0453/08/1912, McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2009] UKEAT 0106/09/3011, Kraft Foods UK 
Ltd v Hastie [2010] 0024/10/0607, Shackletons Garden Centre Ltd v Lowe [2010] UKEAT 
0161/10/2707, Woodcock v Cumbria Primary Care Trust [2010] UKEAT 0489/09/1211, Cherfi 
v G4S Security Services Ltd [2011] UKEAT 0379/10/2405, HM Land Registry v Benson & Ors 
[2011] UKEAT 0197/11/1002, Mba v London Borough of Merton [2012] UKEAT 0332/12/1312, 
Kapenova v Department of Health [2013] UKEAT 0142/13/1404 [2014] ICR 884, Daley-Rowney 
Ltd v HM Revenue & Customs [2014] UKEAT 0273/13/2506, Edie & 15 Ors v HCL Insurance 
BPO Services Ltd [2015] UKEAT 0152/14/0502, Begum v Pedagogy Auras UK Ltd (t/a Barley 
Lane Montessori Day Nursery [2015] UKEAT 0309/13/2205, West Midlands Police & Ors v 
Harrod & Ors [2015] UKEAT 0189/14/0807.
27 The cases appealed further were: Serco v Redfearn [2006] EWCA Civ 359, Redfearn v 
United Kingdom [2009] ECHR 112; Grundy v British Airways Plc [2008] EWCA Civ 875 
CA; Redcar & Cleveland Borough Council v Bainbridge and others [2008] EWCA Civ 885 
CA; Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2012] UKSC 15; South Tyneside 
Metropolitan v Anderson & Ors [2007] EWCA Civ 654 CA.
28 See, for example, Davies v Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council [1999] IRLR 769.
29 Games v University of Kent [2014] All ER (D) 71 (Dec).
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...the test of necessity in Bilka did not mean that the employer must show that the 
measure complained of was necessary in the sense of being the only course open 
to him. The proper test was one of reasonable necessity.30
Although the employer was unsuccessful in establishing justification, it 
is important to note that the employer perceived the test of reasonable 
necessity to be less onerous than a test of strict necessity. This supports the 
assertion that one danger of adopting a test of reasonable necessity is that 
employers may perceive that this provides some leeway with regard to jus-
tification, whereas a test of strict necessity makes clear that only the least 
discriminatory alternative will be justifiable.31
When examining the decisions where the claimant was successful, it soon 
becomes evident that in some areas the EAT is applying a more robust 
level of scrutiny to the issue of justification. This is particularly noticeable in 
equal pay cases. In Davies v Neath Port Talbot CBC32 the EAT overturned 
the decision of the ET that the employer was justified in not paying full-
time wages to a trade union representative while attending a full-time trade 
union course as the claimant normally worked part-time. The EAT directly 
applied the jurisprudence of the CJEU in Arbeiterwohlfahrt der Stadt Berlin 
v Botel,33 finding that there was no justification for failing to compensate the 
applicant in full.
In fact, our analysis reveals a closer adherence to EU law in equal pay 
cases than in cases concerning other types of discrimination, with the major-
ity of such cases resulting in a successful outcome for the claimants. This may 
be due to the wealth of EU jurisprudence in this area, but may equally be 
attributable to the fact that many of the equal pay cases concerned multiple 
claimants represented by large organisations such as trade unions with the 
resources to appeal these cases further, thereby ensuring effective represen-
tation and full consideration of the issue of justification. It is also possible 
that tribunals have become well informed as to the considerable discrimina-
tory impact caused by pay differentials and automatically accord this type of 
discrimination a high weight within the proportionality balance.
All the cases which were successful for the claimant would also have been 
successful if the Bilka test had been applied and all but one would have 
30 South Tyneside Metropolitan Council v Anderson [2007] EWCA Civ 654; [2007] IRLR 715.
31 Connolly n.10.
32 Davis v Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council [1999] UKEAT 449/97/1509 [1999] 
IRLR 796 UKEAT.
33 Case C-360/90 Arbeiterwohlfahrt der Stadt Berlin v Botel (1992).
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been successful if a robust application of proportionality had been adopted. 
The case in which a robust application of proportionality might have pro-
duced a different result from the Bilka test is Redfearn v Serco.34 Redfearn 
was subsequently appealed to the CA and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR),35 but it is the decisions at the level of the ET and EAT 
that we are concerned with here. The facts in Redfearn were that the claim-
ant became a councillor for the British National Party (BNP) which led to 
his dismissal from work. Mr Redfearn took a claim of racial discrimination 
to the ET. The ET considered, inadequately, the issue of indirect discrimi-
nation, deeming the employer’s actions to be proportionate to achieving 
the legitimate aim of maintaining health and safety, as the claimant’s work 
necessitated frequent contact with ethnic minorities to whom the BNP was 
known to be hostile. On appeal, the EAT determined that the ET had pro-
vided inadequate reasons for reaching this decision, taking into account that 
the dismissal had a severe impact on the claimant and that other options 
were available to the employer which could have avoided the claimant hav-
ing to work directly with the public.
If the ET had applied the Bilka approach to this case, the existence of suit-
able, less discriminatory alternatives would almost certainly have defeated 
the employer’s defence of justification. If, however, a wide consideration of 
discriminatory impact had been fully considered by the ET, the employer 
might have succeeded in establishing justification. This is because the impact 
on society as a whole could have been considered. This would have involved 
weighing up the consequences of the infringement on the claimant and the 
full impact of any discrimination against the needs of the employer and 
the impact on society of the discriminatory measure. As this overall picture 
would have included the adverse effects on society of promoting politics 
which endorse discrimination, it is likely that the employer’s need would 
have outweighed—and therefore justified—any discrimination in this case.
Redfearn v Serco is a rare example of how a wide consideration of the 
discriminatory impact could potentially produce a beneficial result for the 
discriminator and which promotes the spirit and purpose of the equality 
legislation. This wider consideration reflects a purposive approach, resulting 
in a decision that is more in accordance with the intentions of anti-discrimi-
nation legislation, the intention of which cannot have been to protect those 
who promote views that endorse discrimination. An analysis of this kind 
34 Redfearn v Serco Ltd [2005] UKEAT 0153/05/2707, [2005] IRLR 744 EAT.
35 Serco Ltd v Redfearn [2006] EWCA Civ 359, Redfearn v United Kingdom 2009] ECHR 112.
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might also have prevented the case being appealed further, as some of the 
issues which were subsequently successful on appeal would have been con-
sidered under a wider application of proportionality.
C. The Unsuccessful Cases
In 23 of the cases which we examined, the claimant was unsuccessful in 
that the EAT deemed the discrimination to be justified. It is our contention 
that applying the Bilka test of strict necessity could have led to a different 
result in relation to justification in 13 of these cases, while applying a robust 
approach to proportionality would have led to a different result in 12 of 
them.36 In theory, therefore, the Bilka test of strict necessity which is applied 
by the CJEU could produce a more favourable result for claimants than 
the Hampson test does. The difference in result between the application of 
the Bilka test and the application of a robust approach to proportionality 
is, however, much less certain. In terms of explaining these differences, it is 
necessary to look in detail at some of these cases.
In Burch v Tesco Stores Ltd,37 concerning sex discrimination, a personnel 
manager was denied promotion on the grounds that she would struggle to 
work more than 32 hours a week due to the demands of her own childcare 
responsibilities. Tesco claimed that it was a necessity for senior manage-
ment to be flexible and available for work 24 hours a day. The ET found 
the discrimination, in this case, to be justified by the employer’s need. The 
EAT allowed this appeal on other grounds, but confirmed the ET’s decision 
on justification, despite the fact that there were alternatives which would 
have met the employer’s need for flexible cover with a lower discriminatory 
impact. The EAT stated:
The civil law of Europe would no doubt describe it as applying the principle of 
proportionality. The balancing exercise by its phraseology is not a question of con-
sidering absolutes it is a matter of balance and none of the language shown allows 
36 St Matthias v Church of England School v Crizzle [1992], Burch v Tesco Stores Ltd [2000], 
Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Council [2007], Middlesborough Council v Surtees & Others 
[2007], West Midland Police v Blackburn & Anor [2007], Eweida v British Airways Plc [2008], 
Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes [2008], Shackletons Garden Centre Ltd v Lowe [2010], Cherfi 
v G4S Security Services Ltd [2011], Mba v London Borough of Merton [2012], Kapenova v 
Department of Health [2013], Edie & 15 Ors v HCL Insurance BPO Services Ltd [2015], West 
Midlands Police & Ors v Harrod & Ors [2015]. Mba would not have been justified if a robust 
approach to proportionality had been applied (see further in this paper).
37 Burch v Tesco Stores Ltd [2000] UKEAT 793 99 1906.
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extremes to be urged on one side or the other, just as justification is no more than 
of convenience, so need does not mean necessity.38
This suggests that the EAT applied a test of reasonableness rather than pro-
portionality in this case. Furthermore, the balancing exercise as described 
by the EAT does not acknowledge that a high weight should be accorded to 
discriminatory impact or that justification is a defence for the employer to 
prove. If a strict test of necessity had been applied in Burch,39 the existence 
of suitable alternatives would almost certainly have led to a finding that the 
discrimination was not justified.
Alternatively, if a robust test of proportionality had been applied, with a 
wide consideration of discriminatory impact, the EAT would have consid-
ered the effect on society of excluding employees with childcare responsibil-
ities (who are predominantly women) from senior management positions. 
The EAT records that at the time of the hearing Tesco employed over 
167,000 staff40 which severely weakens the claim that the employer had a 
real business need for such flexibility from an individual member of staff. 
This need would, therefore, hang lightly in the proportionality balance.
A further case which might have been decided differently under the 
Bilka test is Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Council,41 in which a devout 
Muslim teaching assistant was dismissed for refusing to remove a veil which 
obscured her face. The veil had been found to hamper her ability to make 
herself heard when teaching. The employer could, therefore, demonstrate a 
real need for the claimant to remove her veil in these circumstances.
The claimant agreed to an adjustment by which she would remove her 
veil when male staff were not present. This necessitated a move to another 
year group which consisted of predominantly female staff members. The 
school refused to allow this as the claimant worked part-time and the school 
preferred full-time workers to work with younger year groups. No evidence, 
however, was presented to demonstrate that this constituted a real need 
on the part of the employer. The EAT applied a test of reasonable need 
and found the discrimination against the claimant to be justified. If, how-
ever, a strict test of necessity had been applied, the alternative of allow-




41 Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Council [2007] IRLR 434 [EAT].
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thoroughly investigated. If this proved to be a suitable alternative, the dis-
crimination would not have been justified.
If a robust application of proportionality had been applied, the EAT 
would have had to consider the effect of discrimination against the claim-
ant in a wider sense. This would have included the effect on the predomi-
nantly Muslim local community, the number of Muslim women who might 
be affected by the provision, and the overall societal impact. A recent study 
clearly demonstrates the societal impact of discrimination against Muslims, 
finding that Muslims face the worst employment discrimination of any 
minority group in the UK.42 This significant discriminatory impact should, 
therefore, be an important consideration in claims of indirect discrimination 
by Muslims.
In another case involving a Muslim worker, Cherfi v G4S,43 the claimant 
worked as a security guard for a large firm. For several years, the claim-
ant left work for an hour on Friday lunchtime to attend prayers at a local 
mosque. The claimant’s employer entered into a contract with Jobcentre-
Plus whereby security guards were required to be in attendance through-
out their shift, including the lunch hour, meaning that the claimant was no 
longer able to attend Friday prayers. This caused considerable difficulties for 
the claimant who was then unable to work on a Friday. The ET which con-
sidered the case found that there was discrimination in this case but that it 
was justified by the employer’s need to fulfil the terms of their contract. The 
EAT accepted that the ET had carried out the necessary balancing exercise, 
weighing the employer’s reasonable needs with the discrimination against 
the claimant, and confirmed the ET’s decision. As in the previous case, how-
ever, very little weight was given to discriminatory impact. In fact, consid-
eration of discrimination was limited to the effect on the individual worker. 
Furthermore, little attention was given to the possibility of alternatives that 
would have met the employer’s need with less discriminatory impact.
If the Bilka approach had been applied to this case, the employer would 
have had to demonstrate that it was necessary for the claimant to be on 
site throughout the day on Friday and that there were no less discrimina-
tory alternatives available to fulfil this need. The employer stated that it was 
‘not practicable to bring in another guard to cover the claimant’s lunchtime 
absences’. Nevertheless, given the size and resources of this company, it is 
42 N. Khattab and R. Johnston, ‘Ethnic and Religious Penalties in a Changing Labour Market 
from 2002–2010, the Case of Unemployment’ (2013) 45 Environment and Planning A 1358–71.
43 Cherfi v G4S Security Services Ltd [2011] UKEAT/379/10/DM.
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suggested that practical alternatives to meet the employer’s need should 
have been more fully explored. Applying the Bilka test, the employer would 
have had to establish that it was not possible, rather than not practicable, to 
make an alternative arrangement.
A robust application of proportionality would have revealed a consid-
erable discriminatory impact, which was barely considered by the EAT. 
The societal impact of this discrimination is substantial, since it hinders the 
employment prospects of a minority group who already suffer significant 
workplace discrimination. This considerable discriminatory impact would 
be weighed against the employer’s real need to fulfil its contract. As the 
employer had multiple resources, and there were other less discriminatory 
alternatives available to fulfil the employer’s need, it is likely that if a robust 
application of proportionality had been applied here, the employer would 
have been unable to justify the discrimination. It is important to note that 
Cherfi was decided at a later date to both the CA decision in Elias and the 
Supreme Court ruling in JFS, suggesting that the approach to proportional-
ity outlined in these decisions is routinely ignored at the level of the EAT.
Cherfi can be contrasted with Mba v London Borough of Merton.44 In 
Mba, the claimant was a residential care officer and a devout Christian. She 
worked in a care home, looking after children with severe disabilities who 
required round-the-clock care. The claimant’s religious beliefs meant that she 
was unable to work on a Sunday; this need was accommodated for two years, 
but eventually, it began to cause problems with staffing. This led the employer 
to decide that the only way to maintain adequate staffing was to include the 
claimant in the Sunday rota. When she refused to work on Sundays she was 
disciplined, and she alleged indirect religious discrimination. The ET accepted 
that she had been discriminated against, but found the discrimination to be 
justified when applying the Hampson test. The EAT affirmed this position.
Had the Bilka test been applied to Mba, the claimant would probably 
have succeeded, since there were less discriminatory alternatives available 
which could have met the employer’s need. If, however, a robust applica-
tion of proportionality is applied to this case, it is not clear that the claim-
ant would have succeeded. This is because the discriminatory impact in a 
wider sense is relatively low. Indeed, the research conducted by Khattab 
and Johnston on religious discrimination in the UK workplace found that 
Christian employees suffered very little workplace discrimination.45 Thus, in 
44 Mba v London Borough of Merton [2012] UKEAT/0332/12/1312.
45 Khattab and Johnston n.42. The period examined was 2002–2012.
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relation to proportionality, the discriminatory impact is less. This relatively 
low discriminatory impact could be outweighed, even in a robust applica-
tion of proportionality, by a real need on the part of the employer.
There is still a requirement, however, for the employer to provide evidence 
of a real need that outweighs the discriminatory impact. This is illustrated in 
Eweida v British Airways Plc, in which the claimant, also a devout Christian, 
worked for British Airways.46 The claimant wished to wear a small cross on a 
necklace, but this contravened her employer’s dress code. She was disciplined 
when she insisted on wearing the cross. The ET, EAT and the CA determined 
the case against her. However, when she took her case to the ECtHR, the 
issue of justification was decided in her favour.47 It is interesting to compare 
this decision with that in Mba. While the discriminatory impact in both Mba 
and Eweida was relatively low, the need for British Airways to maintain a 
dress code without religious symbols was also quite weak, leading to a finding 
that the impact on the claimant outweighed the employer’s need. It is sug-
gested that if the Bilka test had been applied to Eweida, the claimant would 
also have succeeded, as the employers’ need for a smart corporate image 
could have been achieved with less discriminatory impact by making some 
small adjustments to the dress code (adjustments which British Airways had 
in fact already implemented by the time of the hearing).
Our analysis of EAT decisions has also revealed that in most cases the ET 
and the EAT do not apply a strict test of necessity in relation to justification. 
This is apparent in a recent decision of the EAT, Kapenova v Department of 
Health.48 The claimant submitted that the ET had erred in applying a test of 
reasonable necessity instead of a test of strict necessity. The EAT expressly 
rejected this submission, citing the decision of the Supreme Court in Homer, 
in which:
Lady Hale, with whom Lord Brown and Lord Kerr agreed, held at paragraph 22:
To be proportionate, a measure has to be both an appropriate means of achieving 
the legitimate aim and (reasonably) necessary in order to do so.49
The EAT rejected the suggestion that, in accordance with European law, a 
defence of justification cannot be made out if there are less discriminatory 
means of achieving the respondent’s aim.
46 Eweida v British Airways Plc [2008] UKEAT 0123/08/2011.
47 Eweida and Ors v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37.
48 Kapenova v Department of Health [2013] ICR 884.
49 Kapenova [81].
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Our analysis of EAT decisions has demonstrated that the absence of a strict 
test of necessity can, in most circumstances, be compensated for if the pro-
portionality assessment includes a wide-ranging consideration of discrimina-
tory impact. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that in most cases neither the 
EAT nor the ET gives this issue sufficient consideration. This is despite the 
existence of judicial precedents such as JFS and Elias. Although justification 
is a defence, which the employer has to prove, the EAT appears to attach more 
importance to obtaining evidence of employers’ needs than to consideration 
of discriminatory impact. Cases such as Cherfi and Burch demonstrate the 
detrimental effect that this has on claimants where the discriminatory impact 
is significant but is never properly weighed in the proportionality balance.
5. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
Our analysis of EAT decisions provides evidence that those claiming that 
they have been subject to religious discrimination may be suffering dispro-
portionately. Eight of the 23 unsuccessful cases analysed concerned religious 
discrimination. This is of particular concern in cases concerning Muslim 
claimants, as evidence suggests that discrimination against this group is a 
serious problem.50 The discriminatory impact in cases concerning Muslims 
should, therefore, be given considerable emphasis. The evidence of this 
study demonstrates that this weighty discriminatory impact is inadequately 
considered by the EAT, and we suggest that it is imperative that courts and 
tribunals are better informed in this area.
With regard to religious discrimination, concerns have been voiced that, in 
practice, religion is afforded less protection than that afforded to other pro-
tected characteristics.51 There is evidence from case law which suggests that 
courts and tribunals may, whether consciously or unconsciously, be engaging 
in a ranking exercise in relation to protected characteristics, to the detri-
ment of religious belief. This seems particularly prevalent in cases where 
competing rights are concerned. For instance, in Ladele v Islington Borough 
Council52 supporting the ‘need’ of a Christian registrar to abstain from same-
sex ceremonies could be seen to endorse discrimination towards same-sex 
couples. Although we sympathise with the difficulties that tribunals face in 
50 Khattab and Johnston n.42.
51 L. Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy’ (2010) 12 
ECC 280–303.
52 Islington v Ladele [2008] UKEAT 0453 08 1912 (19 December 2008).
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these cases, we nevertheless submit that ranking protected characteristics 
is not an appropriate way to deal with competing rights. Indeed, the case 
law of the CJEU has clarified that the level of protection afforded to differ-
ent protected groups should be consistent.53 Furthermore, denigrating the 
importance of religious discrimination has the potential to create injustice 
for religious groups where the discriminatory impact is high. The evidence 
in this study shows that ranking is unnecessary if proportionality is applied 
in a robust way, as a low discriminatory impact will always be outweighed 
by a real need on the part of the discriminator. In addition, competing rights 
are better dealt with by a wide-ranging consideration of societal impact.54
6. THE WAY FORWARD
Our evidence suggests that UK claimants may be losing out in cases of indirect 
discrimination and that the UK is currently failing to fully comply either with 
the letter or with the spirit of EU law. This is due to two factors: the failure of 
UK courts and tribunals to apply a strict test of necessity and the inadequate 
weight given to discriminatory impact within the proportionality assessment.
Furthermore, the minimum standard of scrutiny for justification has been 
clearly set out by the CJEU in Bilka and in Article 2(2)(i) of the Equality 
Directive.55 The UK does not have to implement the provisions of this Directive 
in a literal way, but domestic anti-discrimination must, at the very least, pro-
duce a result that is as effective as that outlined in the Directive.56 The evidence 
examined here, which is both wide-ranging and representative, suggests that 
the approach of the UK courts is not fully compliant with this standard.
To remedy these shortcomings, it is suggested that there are two possi-
ble options. The first option would be for the UK to adopt a strict neces-
sity test in relation to justification. This could be achieved in one of the two 
ways. First, by amending the EqA at section 19(2)(d) to incorporate such a 
test.57 A simple solution would be to replace the wording of section 19(2)
(d) (a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim) with the words 
53 See, for instance, Case C-13/05 Chacon Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA (2006).
54 See Lady Hale’s judgement in Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73; see also Lady Hale, ‘The 
Clash of Equality Rights’ (Lady Hale, Comparative and Administrative Law Conference, Yale 
Law School, 12 March 2014), available at https://www.supremecourt.co (date last accessed 27 
September 2016).
55 Council Directive EC 2000/78/EC.
56 Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm [2005] ECR 1-9981.
57 Equality Act 2010, s 19(2)(d).
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‘objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim 
are appropriate and necessary’, an amendment that would align the wording 
more closely with EU law.58 Alternatively, the Supreme Court could take 
the so-far untried option of interpreting section 19(2)(d) as incorporating 
a strict test of necessity, rather than a test of what is (reasonably) necessary. 
We reluctantly admit, however, that this is extremely unlikely in view of the 
fact that the appeal courts have, on several occasions, rejected the imposition 
of a strict necessity test to justification.59 The second option would be for the 
courts to further develop the Hampson test in a way which ensures that a 
robust application of proportionality is applied to the justification defence.
Both of these options carry their own advantages and disadvantages. It 
may only be possible to remove discrimination by having a strict test of 
necessity since anything less gives the employer leeway to discriminate and 
blurs the cause of disparate impact.60 From the evidence of the cases exam-
ined here, where the hypothetical application of a strict test of necessity 
resulted in a more favourable outcome for the claimant, this was due to the 
existence of suitable, less discriminatory alternatives. This suggests that if 
such a test were to be incorporated into the EqA, the protection afforded to 
claimants from indirect discrimination would be strengthened.
A further advantage of incorporating the Bilka test into UK law is its 
simplicity. The current test has led to considerable difficulties in interpreta-
tion since it leaves a great deal of discretion to tribunals. The advantage of a 
strict test of necessity is that, in reducing the discretion of an ET, any latent 
discrimination might be eliminated. Since employment tribunals are not 
generally composed of those groups who are most likely to experience dis-
crimination,61 there is a danger that judicial ‘common sense’ may reinforce, 
rather than challenge, discrimination.62 This is a particular risk with indirect 
discrimination where the practices being considered may seem innocuous 
to those who are not personally troubled by them. A straightforward test of 
58 See the suggestions made for amendment of the Equality Bill by the Liberal Democrats 
PBC (EB) 8th session col 283 (16 June 2009). Parliamentary Committee for the Equality Bill 
June 2009.
59 See Homer v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2012] UKSC 15.
60 See Connolly n.10.
61 J. Aston, D. Hill and N. D. Tackey, The Experience of Claimants in Race Discrimination 
Employment Tribunal Cases (2006) DTI Employment Relations Research Series No. 55, 
and M.  Peters, K.  Seeds and C.  Harding, Findings from the Survey of Claimants in Race 
Discrimination Employment Tribunal Cases (2000) DTI Employment Relation Research 
Series No. 54.
62 J. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (London: Fontana, 1981).
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necessity is likely, therefore, to strengthen protection for claimants and to 
increase the consistency of decision-making at the level of the ET.
There are disadvantages, however, in incorporating the Bilka test into UK 
law. A strict test of business necessity is inflexible, and can be overly defer-
ential to the needs and discretion of business. Also, while the Bilka formula-
tion does not preclude any consideration of discriminatory impact, neither 
does it specifically encourage it and there is a risk that weighty discrimina-
tory impacts will not be given sufficient consideration if this test is adopted 
(nevertheless, this is not inevitable since the Bilka test in fact has four sepa-
rate elements to it, each of which needs to be considered: real need, appro-
priateness, necessity and proportionality,63 although in reality the last part of 
the test is rarely highlighted).64
Another potential difficulty is that under Bilka the question of justifica-
tion is heavily dependent on the choice of legitimate aim. This leads to a risk 
in that an employer could tailor a legitimate aim to fit the Bilka require-
ments. This is a particular danger since courts and tribunals are increasingly 
willing to accept cost-saving as a legitimate aim. Although this was initially 
rejected by the courts (Hill and Stapleton v The Revenue Commissioners 
and Department of Finance),65 in Cross v British Airways, it was accepted 
that, while cost-saving alone cannot constitute a legitimate aim, costs-sav-
ing plus further factors could do so.66 This gives an employer even greater 
leeway in establishing a legitimate aim particularly in the current climate 
of austerity. This highlights a serious shortcoming of the Bilka test which 
is ultimately more deferential to the needs of business than to the aim of 
achieving substantive equality.
The lack of flexibility in the Bilka test can also be a problem, clearly dem-
onstrated in Redfearn v Serco where the existence of alternative means pre-
vented the dismissal of a BNP councillor from being justified under a strict 
test of necessity. This case highlights the need for courts to have the freedom 
to consider the societal implications of a measure.
A further consideration in relation to adopting the Bilka test would be 
the implications of the UK leaving the EU. If the UK courts failed to fully 
63 See Case C-127/92, Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority [1993] ECR 1-5535.
64 S. Anderson, ‘Constitutional Law and Labour Law Dimensions of Article 119: The Case 
of Justification for Indirect Discrimination’ in J. Dine and B. Watt (eds), Discrimination Law 
Concepts, Limitations and Justifications (London: Longman, 1996).
65 Hill and Stapleton v The Revenue Commissioners and Department of Finance [1995], Case 
C-243/95.
66 Cross v British Airways [2004] UKEAT/0572/04.
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apply the jurisprudence of the CJEU prior to ‘Brexit’, it is unlikely that they 
will succumb to it now. The alternative option, which is for the UK courts to 
develop a more robust approach to existing anti-discrimination law, becomes 
even more compelling if the UK leaves the EU. Furthermore, as the UK 
courts have already considered discriminatory impact in a wider sense in 
cases such as JFS and Elias, this would be a natural development of UK case 
law. Encouraging this would help domestic anti-discrimination legislation 
to develop in a progressive way if the UK courts cease to be bound by the 
rulings of the CJEU. This would reduce the risk of UK anti-discrimination 
legislation being undermined by the UK’s exit from the EU. In addition, as 
pointed out by Baker, this approach would be more consistent with the con-
cept of justification under the European Convention on Human Rights.67 
Since proportionality in this context is about striking a balance between 
the infringement of a right and a legitimate aim,68 adopting this approach in 
respect of domestic anti-discrimination legislation would ensure that these 
provisions develop in tandem with human rights legislation.
7. CONCLUSION
Our examination of EAT decisions shows that, where a robust application of 
proportionality is adopted, this has almost equivalent benefits for claimants 
as a strict test of necessity. In addition, as demonstrated in Redfearn, it gives 
the Court greater flexibility in cases where a strict test of necessity might 
produce a result which is out of kilter with the intentions of anti-discrimi-
nation legislation. A robust approach to proportionality requires the court 
to consider information regarding discriminatory impact, allowing the court 
to make an informed decision as to discriminatory effects. Furthermore, as 
this approach is evidence based, the decision-making process would have 
greater transparency, even in areas where the court has discretion.
The difficulty with this approach is that evidence appears to point to courts 
adopting varying degrees of intensity in the application of proportionality.69 In 
addition, UK courts have not applied proportionality in the context of human 
rights any more robustly or consistently than they have in respect of anti-dis-
crimination legislation. There is still considerable debate as to the appropriate 
67 Baker n.11.
68 Belgian Linguistics Case (No 2) (1968) 1 EHRR 252.
69 See comments of the Lords in Hunag v SSHD [2007] UKHL 11.
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intensity of review within a proportionality assessment. Lord Hoffman, for 
instance, expressed the view that there is little difference between proportion-
ality and Wednesbury70 reasonableness.71 Others, such as Rivers, state that the 
intensity of a proportionality review should be in parallel with the seriousness 
of the right infringed,72 while Chan states that proportionality requires, at the 
very least, a baseline review for all rights.73 Our evidence suggests that the 
EAT and ET do not consistently apply proportionality assessments with a 
high level of intensity. Our view is that in the context of justification the appli-
cation of proportionality should include a consideration of the societal impact 
of discrimination. This would increase the intensity of review and ensure that 
decisions comply with the intentions of anti-discrimination legislation.
Our evidence suggests that the UK’s current approach to justification 
results, for the most part, in a ‘watered down’ application of proportionality 
as necessity is qualified by reasonableness and the discriminatory impact is 
not adequately weighed. This is frustrating, as a robust application of pro-
portionality could have a substantial positive impact on the effectiveness of 
anti-discrimination legislation. Furthermore, this approach could have some 
advantages over the application of a strict necessity test. It could, for exam-
ple, provide a better balance between competing rights and discriminatory 
impacts; it would allow the courts to vary the intensity of review according 
to the weight of discriminatory impact; and the courts could more easily 
apply proportionality in accordance with the intentions of anti-discrim-
ination provisions, providing there is sufficient evidence as to the overall 
effect of a discriminatory measure. Perhaps most importantly, it has greater 
potential to challenge discrimination than the Bilka test, since a significant 
discriminatory impact could outweigh business necessity.
Additionally, although the application of a robust approach to propor-
tionality is complex and involves the court in determining questions of a 
socio-legalistic nature, this should present no more difficulties for tribunals 
than assessing the real and objective needs of an employer. Furthermore, 
although a full consideration of discriminatory impact would require the 
70 Associated Provincial Picture House Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1KB 223. 
‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ is the common law threshold for judicial review.
71 Rt. Hon. Lord Hoffman, ‘The Influence of the European Principle of Proportionality upon 
UK Law’, in E. Ellis (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Oxford: 
Hart, 1999).
72 J. Rivers, ‘The Presumption of Proportionality’ (2014) 77 MLR 409–33.
73 C. Chan, ‘Proportionality and Invariable Baseline Intensity of Review’ (2013) 33 Legal 
Studies 1–21.
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court or tribunal to consider extensive evidence of discriminatory impact, 
this information is readily available. High-quality, objective research on the 
effects of discrimination is available from organisations such as the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission and elsewhere.74 Such evidence has recently 
been used to good effect in discrimination cases concerning welfare legisla-
tion. Cases such as R (SE v SSWP)75 which concerned sexual discrimination 
in respect of a benefit cap and Hurley & Orrs v SSWP [2015]76 demonstrate 
how a Court can make a more informed decision as to the legality of a dis-
criminatory measure when its full impact is considered.
Hurley concerned a measure to restrict benefits for carers. This was 
deemed to be unjustified by the High Court on the grounds that the discrim-
ination to carers was disproportionate. In this case, extensive evidence was 
provided to the court by organisations such as Carers UK.77 This included 
information as to how much money carers saved the public purse—esti-
mated to be about £119 billion pounds per annum. This evidence was crucial 
in outweighing the Government’s legitimate aim which was to save money 
by encouraging carers to take up paid employment.
We suggest that representatives and claimants in cases concerning indi-
rect discrimination routinely present wide-ranging evidence of discrimina-
tory impact alongside helpful case law precedents such as Elias and JFS. 
This approach may act to encourage tribunals to adopt a more robust 
approach to proportionality and assist the development of the law in this 
area. Academics can also assist practitioners by producing high-quality 
research on the societal impact of discrimination. We suggest that this is 
necessary, as although this study has demonstrated that the UK is not fully 
compliant with EU standards with regard to justification, there is no indica-
tion that either the UK Government or the courts have any intention of 
amending the law. Therefore, although regrettable, it is unlikely that either 
of the two options identified in this study will be pursued unless concerned 
parties take action to initiate change.
74 See for instance ‘How Fair is Britain’ (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
2010)  https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/how-fair-britain/full-report-and-evidence-
downloads (date last accessed 17 October 2016); Khattab and Johnston n.42; and B. Hepple, 
M. Coussey and T. Choudhury, Equality: A New Framework; Report of the Independent Review 
of the Enforcement of UK Anti-discrimination Legislation (Oxford: Hart, 2000).
75 R (on the application of SG and others) v SSWP [2015] UKSC 16.
76 Hurley & Orrs v SSWP [2015] EWHC 3382 (Admin).
77 See ‘Policy and Research’ (Carers UK) https://www.carersuk.org/forprofessionals (date last 
accessed 18 October 2016).
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